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Amazon.com v. Dee Dee Magee, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 63, 119 P.3d 732          
(Sept. 22, 2005)1 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
Summary 
This case is an appeal from the district court’s order denying a petition for judicial review 
in a workers’ compensation case. 
Disposition/Outcome 
Reversed and remanded.  The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order 
denying Amazon.com’s petition for judicial review and remanded it for further proceedings.  The 
Court concluded that a worker who is released to work with restrictions is only temporarily 
partially disabled.  Therefore, the employee’s position and salary need not comport with Nevada 
Revised Statutes (“NRS”) 616.4752 that sets forth the standards by which an employer, in 
offering modified employment to the injured worker, can stop making temporary total disability 
payments.   
Factual and Procedural History 
On April 18, 2001, Dee Dee Magee (“Magee”) injured her right wrist while working for 
her employer Amazon.com.  Magee sought out and obtained medical treatment in which the 
treating physician diagnosed her injury as possible carpal tunnel syndrome; no x-rays were taken 
at the time.  The treating physician placed her wrist in a forearm splint and prescribed naproxen.  
On April 23, 2001, Magee sought further medical advice regarding the cause and extent 
of her injury.  After examination, the physician advised Magee that her symptoms did not 
coincide with obvious carpal tunnel syndrome but advised Magee to continue wearing the 
forearm splint for two (2) weeks and placed Magee on restricted duty without elaborating on the 
nature of the restrictions. 
From May 14 to June 10, 2001 Magee sought additional medical advice and after each 
visit was released to light duty work subject to certain physical restrictions and limitations.  After 
a June 11, 2001 visit, Magee was released to return to work but was limited to light-duty and 
only for four hours a day. 
On August 13, 2001, Magee underwent corrective surgery on her right wrist.  
Subsequently, Magee was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome in her left wrist.  Magee 
underwent a second surgery to repair her left wrist.  Magee was released to full-duty work with 
no restrictions on October 30, 2001. 
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2 Although NEV. REV. STAT. §616C.475 was amended in 2003 and 2005, the Court relied on the 1999 version 
because it was in effect at the time of respondent’s claim. 
Prior to Magee’s wrist injury, she worked a total of forty (40) hours per week, 
approximately ten (10) hours per day, and four days a week.  She was paid $10.00 per hour for a 
gross weekly wage of $400.00.  After Magee’s initial wrist injury in which she was restricted in 
the number of hours she could work, she continued to earn $10.00 per hour.  Although Magee’s 
daily and weekly work hours varied, she generally never worked more than four hours a day or 
sixteen hours a week. 
Magee submitted workers’ compensation claims for her injuries to her wrists.  
Amazon.com never disputed either the diagnosis or that the condition was the result of her 
employment.  Amazon.com’s insurer determined that for the period of May 5 through October 
30, 2001 Magee was eligible for temporary partial disability benefits under NRS 616C.500 with 
at least two (2) periods when she was eligible for temporary total disability benefits.  The first 
period of Magee’s temporary total disability began after the right wrist surgery on August 13, 
2001 and ended on August 24, 2001 when she returned to light duty work and collected 
temporary partial disability benefits.  The second period of Magee’s temporary total disability 
was after Magee’s left wrist surgery on October 3, 2001 and ended on October 16, 2001 after 
Magee was released to light duty work.  All benefits stopped upon Magee’s release to return to 
full duty work without any restrictions. 
Magee administratively appealed the insurer’s determinations to a workers’ 
compensation hearing officer contending that under NRS 616C.475 she was entitled to 
temporary total disability benefits for the entire period of May 5 through October 30, 2001.  The 
hearing officer disagreed and affirmed the insurer’s determinations. 
Magee appealed the hearing officer’s decision to an appeals officer asserting that for the 
periods she was restricted to working four hours a day, she was entitled to either temporary total 
disability benefits in the amount of 66 2/3 percent of her average monthly salary with no work 
requirement or her pre-injury gross salary while she worked her modified scheduled.  The 
appeals officer agreed and reversed the hearing officer’s decision.  The appeals officer relied on 
NRS 616C.475(8) and ordered Amazon.com to pay Magee her pre-injury gross pay for the 
periods when Magee was restricted to working only four hours a day. 
Amazon.com filed a petition for judicial review with the district court alleging the 
appeals officer erred in applying NRS 616C.475(8) in calculating Magee’s benefits.  The district 
court denied the petition determining NRS 616C.475(8) was the proper statute to apply to the 
calculation of payments in this case.  Amazon.com appealed the district court’s order denying its 
petition. 
Discussion 
The Court, in reviewing the application of statutes governing disability payments, does so 
independently and without deference to the district court’s conclusions.3   
Under NRS 616C.475(1) an employee who is classified as temporarily totally disabled is 
entitled to receive for the period of temporary total disability, 66 2/3 percent of their average 
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monthly wage.  Under NRS 616C.475(5), however, temporary total disability benefits stop when 
a physician determines the employee is physically capable of any gainful employment for which 
the employee is suited.4  When an employer provides a temporarily totally disabled employee 
with a post-injury job similar in hours, location, and gross pay to the job the employee held prior 
to the injury giving adequate consideration to the employee’s post-injury limitations, the 
employer can stop paying the employee temporary total disability benefits in the amount of 66 
2/3 percent of the employee’s pre-injury wage.5 
Nevertheless, NRS 616C.475 only applies to employees who are considered temporarily 
totally disabled.  Total disability arises when an employee is injured from an accident “arising 
out of and in the course of employment which prevents the covered worker from engaging, for 
remuneration or profit, in any occupation for which he is or becomes reasonably fitted by 
education, training or experience.”6  The Court determined the appeals officer erred by 
concluding that Magee was totally disabled during the periods when she was restricted to 
working four hours a day.  The Court found that while Magee was unable to earn her pre-injury 
wages due to her physician restricting her to work only a four (4) hour workday, she was only 
partially disabled and not totally disabled.  Therefore, Magee was not entitled to temporary total 
disability benefits because her physical disabilities and work limitations did not prevent her from 
earning wages. 
The Court further stated that the appeals officer compounded the error by reading NRS 
616C.475(8) to mean Magee was temporarily totally disabled and her employer Amazon.com 
was required to pay Magee her pre-injury gross salary.  The Court stated that NRS 616C.475(8) 
should not be used to calculate the amount of temporary total disability because its purpose is to 
define whether a modified job offered by an employer to a temporarily totally disabled employee 
enables the employer to stop temporary total disability payments.  This provision of the statute 
allows an employer to make productive use of the injured employee in lieu of paying the 
employee 66 2/3 percent of the employee’s gross pay while the employee remains temporarily 
totally disabled.   
Conclusion 
The Court concluded the hearing officer was correct in concurring with the insurer’s 
determination that Magee was entitled to temporary partial disability benefits during the periods 
when she was restricted to four-hour workdays.  The Court reasoned that the appeals officer’s 
reliance and interpretation of NRS 616C.475 would result in an absurdity by requiring Magee’s 
employer, Amazon.com, to pay Magee her pre-injury gross wage when she was capable of 
gainful employment. 
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